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Abstract-This paper provides a factual assessment of China’s population aging and its social and 
economic consequences. It is projected that China will have a substantially older population in the middle 
of the 2lst century. Major policy implications concerning old age support and health care have been 
examined. 
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Accounting for nearly a quarter of the human race, 
China also has the largest population of older people 
(aged 65 and over) of any country in the world. The 
implementation of family planning policies has 
greatly accelerated the aging of its population. This 
paper aims to provide a factual assessment of this 
phenomenon and its social and economic con- 
sequences. In particular, based on the 1982 Chinese 
national census, a profile of the Chinese aged will be 
presented first. This encompasses the size and growth 
of the older population, life expectancy, causes of 
death, sex ratio, and dependency ratios. Further- 
more, socioeconomic characteristics and the pattern 
of labor force participation of the Chinese elderly will 
be described. Second, the process of population aging 
will be examined within the context of demographic 
transition in China since 1949. The impact of the two 
baby booms during the last 30 years and the 
influences of population policies toward birth control 
upon population will be discussed. Third, social and 
economic implications of population aging in China 
will be examined. These include issues such as the 
newly emerged family structure, old age support, 
social mobility, long-term care, health care, and 
implications for future economic development. 
CHARhCTERlSTlCS OF THE OLDER POPULATIOS 
China has more than one billion people accounting 
for 22% of the world’s population [I]. With a per 
capita gross national product of S281 in 1982 (as 
compared with $12,820 in the United States in 1981) 
China ranks in the bottom third of the developing 
nations [2, 31. In view of the fact that the percentage 
*This is a revised version of a paper presented at the Annual 
.Meering of rhe Popularion rlssociarion of America. 
Boston, Massachusetts, March 28-30. 1985. 
+Due to space limitations. a table of age compositions of 
selected countries is not included. It will be made 
available upon request from the authors. 
aged 65 and over in the world was 5.8 in 1980. China 
has a relatively young population. In 1953, about 25 
million persons, 4.4% of the total population in 
China, were of age 65 and over. This age group grew 
to over 49 million persons in 1982, accounting for 
4.9% of China’s population (Table I). If one defines 
old age as 60 years of age or older, China had an 
older population of about 42 million people, 7.3% of 
the total population in 1953. This group numbered 
76.6 million persons or 7.6% of the total population 
in 1982. Between 1953 and 1982, the 60 and over 
population grew at an annual rate of 2.14% while the 
total population increased at a rate of 2% per year. 
Of the total population aged 60 and over in 1982, 
35.7% were 60 to 64 years old; 27.7% were 65 to 69 
years old; 18.7% were 70 to 74 years of age; 11.3% 
were 75 to 79 years old; and 6.6% were 80 years of 
age or older. In terms of the age composition of the 
60-and-over population, China clearly resembles de- 
veloping countries although it has a higher propor- 
tion of older people than any other developing Asian, 
African, or Latin American nation [4]. In contrast, 
developed countries such as Sweden, United States, 
and Japan have higher proportions of 70-and-over 
and 80-and-over populations+. 
Life expectancy in China has increased substan- 
tially since 1949 (Table 2). Life expectancy at birth 
was about 35 years before 1949. According to Coale 
[5], life expectancy at birth in 1953-1964 was 42.2 
years for males and 45.6 years for females. In 
1964-1982, it rose to 61.6 years for males and 63.2 for 
females. Based on the 1982 census, the 1981 life 
expectancy at birth in China was 67.9 years; 66.4 
years for males and 69.4 for females. At 65, life 
expectancy is estimated to be 13.6 years. At this age, 
females are expected to outlive males by 2.16 years. 
With a median age at death of 67.5 years, the three 
leading causes of death are heart disease, cere- 
brovascular diseases, and malignant neoplasms, 
reflecting a pattern of mortalities similar to that of an 
aging population. This pattern also represents a 
dramatic shift in causes of death during the past three 
decades. Respiratory diseases, acute infectious dis- 
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Table 1. .Agc structures of China !n 1953. 1964, and 1992 
1953 1964 1932 
Numbers Numbers Sumbers 
Age in loo0 % in 1000 94 I” 1000 “‘0 
O-14 206.845 35.67 18 I.650 10.53 337.251 33.15 
Is-64 347.558 59.94 385.608 55.92 62 I .506 61.65 
65 and over 25,401 4.38 24.687 3.55 49.366 4.89 
Total 519,804 100.00 694,944 100.00 I .008.123 100 00 
60 and over 42. I42 7.27 42.427 6.10 16.719 7.61 
Source: Co& A. J. Rapid Populotton Change in China. 19St-1981 National Academy Press. 
Washington, D.C., 1984. 
Table 2. Life expectancies by gender, China, 1953-63. 196+82, and 1981 
Life exoectancies 
Total 
DoDulatlon Male Female 
Before /949(a) 
Life expectancy at birth 
/953-&l(b) 
Life expectancy at birth 
Life expectancy at 65 
/963-X-7( b ) 
Life expectancy at birth 
Life expectancy at bj 
35.00 - 
- 42.20 45.58 
- 1.58 9.59 
- 61.64 63.22 
- Il.29 12.93 
198/(a) 
Life expectancy at birth 







Sources: (a) Jiang 2.. Zhang W. and Zhu L. A preliminary exammation of life 
expectancy in China. Ren Kou Yu Jing J; (Popul &con.) 3, 1417. 1984. (b) 
Coale A. J. Rapid Population Change in China. 1952-1982. National Acad- 
emy Press, Washington, D.C., 1984. 
eases, and tuberculosis were the three leading causes of illiteracy or semi-illiteracy of 82% which is much 
of death in 1957 13, p. 171. higher than its urban counterpart (@%).t 
Among those 60 years of age and over, the sex ratio 
is 87 which is higher than those in the more developed 
countries but is lower than in other developing 
countries such as India and Singapore.* In China, old 
people exhibit a profile of marital statuses similar to 
those in other countries. Specially, some 70% of older 
men are married and about 25% are widowed. Only 
2.5% of older men have never been married and 
1.5% are divorced. For older women, some 40% of 
them are married while nearly 60% are widowed. 
Only 0.3% of older women have never been married 
and less than 0.5% of them are divorced. In com- 
parison with developed countries, China has much 
lower rates of singlehood and divorce (Table 3). 
The Chinese elderly generally have very little edu- 
cation. Nearly 80% of the aged are illiterate or 
semi-illiterate. This proportion is more than twice as 
much as that for the population 12 years of age or 
older (i.e. 32%). Only some 5% of the elderly have 
an educational background equivalent to junior high 
school or more. There are substantial gender and 
urban vs rural differences in educational background. 
While 61% of elderly men are illiterate or semi- 
illiterate, over 95% of older women belong to the 
same category. In addition, rural areas exhibit a rate 
For employees of the government and the state or 
collective enterprises in China, the retirement age is 
60 for men and 55 for women. Using this definition 
of older population, the labor force participation rate 
of older persons in 1982 was 26% [6]. That is, 43% 
of the men 60 years of age or over were still in the 
labor force whereas only 16% of women 55 years of 
age or older were. However, it should be noted that 
the state and collective sectors account for only 25% 
of the total labor force and for agriculture labor 
retirement is less likely to be a viable option. Con- 
sequently, the labor force participation rate for the 
old population is probably understated. According to 
the 1982 Chinese national census, the majority of 
older workers (84.8%) were engaged in farming and 
fishing. In comparison with the total population, 
there are higher percentages of older people in oc- 
cupations such as governmental administrators and 
business managers (1.3%), business (2.1%), service 
(4.1%), and farming and fishing (84.8%; Table 4). 
POPULATION AGING IN CHISA 
*Due to space limitations. a table presenting sex ratios for 
the old populations in selected countries is not included. 
It will be made available upon request. 
tA table describing the proportions of illiterate population 
in the PRC is available upon request. 
Demographers have long studied the process of 
population aging [7, 81. It has been demonstrated that 
population aging is essentially due to declines in 
fertility. Mortality declines in general have little effect 
on the age structure, and the few effects actually 
observed produce younger age structures. This is 
because typical improvements in health and medicine 
produce the greatest increases in survivorship among 
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Table 3. Mariral status of the older populatmn (in percentage). China. 1982 
Single Married Widowed Divorced 
A&e Male Female Male Female %le Female Male Female 
1355 
I5 and over 32.7 24.2 61.9 65.5 4.5 10.0 0.9 0.3 
S&59 3.0 0.2 86.5 82.2 8.5 17.2 2.0 0.5 
60-79 2.5 0.3 70.6 44.2 25.3 55.1 1.6 0.4 
80 and over 2.5 0.3 37.2 7. I 59.5 92.5 0.S 0.1 
Source: State Statistical Bureau. Major Figures by IO Percent Sampling Tabularion on rhe 1982 
Popularion Census ofrhe People’s Repub/ic o/China. Population Census Office. State Council 
and Department of Population Statistics. State Statistical Bureau. Beijing. 1953. 
the young rather than the old. The effect of declining 
mortality is obscured by the much more powerful 
force of a falling birth rate occurring at the same 
time. This situation, however, may be changing. In 
countries where a life expectancy of 70 years or more 
has been reached, increases in longevity make the 
population older. Since there is little room to further 
improve survivorship of the young, any gains in 
longevity must concentrate at older ages [9]. 
With relatively high fertility and low mortality 
during most of the three and one-half decades since 
1949, China has been a ‘young’ population. Children 
under age 15 constituted 36% of the total population 
in 1953. This proportion climbed to over 40% in 1964 
and then dropped to 33% in 1982 (Table 1). Mean- 
while, the proportion of elderly persons aged 65 and 
over remained below 5% (i.e. 4.4% in 1953, 3.6% in 
1964 and 4.9% in 1982). Given the rapidly declining 
birth rate and relatively steady and low death rate, 
the population is expected to age rapidly from now 
on. This is especially true if the one-child family 
policy is successful. 
Coale [IO] has projected that, if China reaches zero 
population growth by the year 2000, about one 
quarter of the entire population will be over the age 
of 65 by 2035. Keyfitz [I 1, 121 made projections with 
an ultimate goal of a stationary population at 1.2 
billion in the year 2000. His projections assume births 
to be stabilized at 16.7 million each year and slightly 
falling mortality levels. These projections result in a 
favorable age structure until 2005. This is because the 
large recent cohorts of the 1920s and the 1980s are in 
retirement and in school respectively. After 2005, 
however, the fraction of elderly persons would begin 
to increase sharply. By 2040, when the last of the 
cohorts born between 1960 and 1975 reach 65, the 
proportion of the aging population would reach its 
highest level at 20%. The ratio of old people to labor 
force will first decline and after 2000 will rise as the 
baby boom cohorts of the 1960s come up for retire- 
ment. The peak of the proportion of old people will 
occur in the 2040s. 
However, both projections started with a total 
population of 9 10 million in 1975. Coale [IO] assumed 
that the birth rate in 1975 was 24.6 per 1000. falling 
to I9 per 1000 in 1980. Expectation of life at birth was 
about 65 years in 1975-1980, and will rise to 70 years 
by 1995-2000. Keyfitz [I 1, 121, instead of using 1975 
population as a base year. calculated 1980 population 
from 1975 population to complete projections from 
1980 on. We feel that it is necessary to develop our 
own projections based on the 1982 adjusted census 
population [5, pp. 78-801, since all previous 
projections were made before the 1982 census became 
available. 
Before presenting our projections of China’s popu- 
lation, a brief description of the changes in mortality, 
fertility, and population growth are in order. In 
China, the death rate declined from roughly 25.5 
deaths per 1000 people in 1953 to 7.3 per 1000 in 
1981, with an interruption by an increase reaching a 
peak rate of 38.8 deaths per 1000 during the food 
crisis years of 195x-1961. Hence, the population 
transition in China started in 1962 when the crude 
death rate began its steady decline (Fig. 1). With the 
release of age structures from China’s three censuses, 
Coale [5, p, 701 estimated the intercensal life ex- 
pectancies. The expectation of life at birth was 42.2 
years for males and 45.6 years for females in 
1953-1964, and rose to 61.6 for males and 63.2 for 
females in 1964-1982. Mortality in the 1953-1964 
intercensal period was high. The pattern for survival 
for 1964-1982 shows relatively low mortality for a 
developing country. 
Between 1950 and 1982, the birth rate fell by 50%. 
The decline, however, has not been smooth or steady. 
The birth rate has fluctuated sharply with changes in 
political upheavals and birth control pro--s. In 
Table 4. Occupational distribution of the older population. China. 1982 
Older population Whole population 
in labor force in labor force 
Occupations 
Percentage of older people Males per female 
(%) (%I in the specific occupation for older workers 
Professional and technician 2.00 5.07 1.82 3.3 
Governmental or business managers 1.2s 1.55 3.83 3.6 
Clerical 0.49 1.30 1.75 3.5 
Business 2.14 I.81 5.51 I.8 
Set-vice 4.13 2.20 8.74 ?.I 
Farming and fishing 84.83 72.02 5.49 1.6 
Industrial and transportation workers 5.1 I 15.96 1.49 2.4 
Total 100.00 100.00 - - 
Source: State Statistical Bureau. .Wajor Figurer by IO Percenr Sampling Tabulation on the 1981 Popularion Census of rhe Peoplr’r Republic 
of Chino. Population Census Office. State Council and Department of Population Statistics. State Statistical Bureau. Beijing. 1983. 
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Fig. 1. Crude birth rates and crude death rates in China. 1953-1981. 
1950 the rate was 41.3 births per 1000 people, a level 
that had prevailed for two decades. As a result of the 
Great Leap Forward in 1958-1959 and the famine of 
1960-1961, the birth rate fell to around 25 per 1000 
in 1959-1961. In the 1962 economic recovery, the 
birth rate bounced back and peaked at 44 per 1000 
in 1963. During the Cultural Revolution of the late 
1960s birth planning was abandoned. The birth rate 
fluctuated between 38 per 1000 in 1966 and 34 per 
1000 in 1967 and rose to 39 per 1000 in 1968. 
The full effect of organized population control 
began to be felt in the 1970s. The birth planning 
campaign was launched with the slogan “Later, 
Longer, Fewer” in 1971. It was succeeded in 1979 by 
an even more restrictive program: the one-child cam- 
paign. By 1980 the birth rate had decreased to 18.5 
per 1000. According to the 1982 census. there has 
been a recent increase in birth rate to 21.1 per 1000 
population. This probably signals the start of a 
long-term trend as the large cohorts of people born 
during the 1960s baby boom reach marriage and 
childbearing ages over the coming decade. Another 
factor recognized by Tien [13], was the boom in 
marriages in 198 1 among those in their early twenties. 
This was made possible by the implementation of the 
1980 Marriage Law. In general, the stable decline of 
fertility started from 1971 which is about nine years 
behind the steady decline of mortality. 
Population aging is a by-product of population 
transition which is a long-term and presumably per- 
manent change in the level of the birth and death 
rates of a population. Usually, mortality rates decline 
before fertility rates. Accordingly, an early effect of 
the transition is an increase in the rate of population 
growth. This is the stage in which China is right now. 
Because the death rate has declined so rapidly, the 
population is still growing even though fertility has 
begun to fall. The rate of natural- increase was 17.6 
per 1000 people in 1953. After raising to 34.3 per 1000 
in 1963, the rate has recently fallen, but only to 13 per 
1000 in 1982. If this rate were maintained, the 
population in China would double itself every 53 
years. 
There was much debate in China about how many 
people the country’s resources can support. In 1980 
the Chinese Communist Party set the goal of 1.2 
billion by the end of the 20th century. Furthermore, 
the government’s goal is that the population should 
then be stationary. Within this goal and following 
Keyfitz’s approach [I I, 121, we made several assump- 
tions. First. the decline to replacement-level fertility 
in China came in about 1982. Second, the death rate 
will continue to decline at the pace of the past few 
years. Third. the population in the year 2000 will be 
1.2 billion. In order to achieve a stationary popu- 
lation of 1.2 billion, fertility must be below the 
replacement level before 2000. One way to arrive at 
a stationary population is to have a constant number 
of births each year. In China, with its unique political 
organization, it appears to be able to control the 
annual number of births with considerable precision 
WI. 
Our projections were based on the assumption that 
the annual number of births will be constant from 
now on. Although the assumption of immediate birth 
stationarity is unrealistic, this simplifies the 
projection considerably. It should be emphasized that 
our purpose here is merely to illustrate the con- 
sequences of fertility decline on age distribution. The 
life expectancy at birth over the next two generations 
will be 70.26 years from lModel Life Tables (141. If the 
mortality follows this course and an ultimate station- 
ary population of 1.2 billion is assumed, then the 
corresponding annual births is 17.08 million. For the 
sake of simplicity we assumed that the decline to the 
constant number of births took place in 1982. 
Our projections demonstrate a well-known 
phenomenon-demographic momentum, which is 
the tendency: for population growth to continue 
beyond the time that replacement level fertility has 
been achieved. This is because of a relatively high 
concentration of people in the childbearing years. 
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Fig. 2. Population projection for China. 1982-2042 
This is precisely what will happen in China. The large 
cohort made up of those born in the 1960s and 1970s 
will for many years continue to grow to 1.31 billion 
in 2032 and then decline to below 1.2 billion in 2072. 
The hump for ages 5-19 of 1982 will appear at ages 
2.5-39 in the year 2002 (Fig. 2) and so on; it will not 
disappear until 2062. This shifting peak is an inevita- 
ble feature of the Chinese population in the years to 
come, since the large cohorts in question are already 
born. The large numbers will be at young adult ages 
in 1997 and 2002, requiring very low fertility to 
maintain a low rate of increase. This very low fertility 
in turn will produce a very small proportion of young 
people in the population of subsequent years. 
As the members of these large cohorts age and 




by the small cohorts born after the annual number of 
births decline to 17.08 million. The immediate effects 
on the ratio of working force to the dependent 
population would be favorable. The fraction of the 
population in the working ages from 15 to 6-I would 
continue to rise until 2007 (Fig. 3). After 2007, 
however, the proportion of 65 and over would begin 
to increase sharply. By 2042, when the last of the 
cohorts born between 1960 and 1977 reach 65, the 
ratio of ages 65 and over to the working population 
would reach its highest level-34 elderly persons per 
100 workers. 
Our projections also indicate that the dependency 
ratio will decline from 62.2 in 1982 to the 40s during 
1992-2027 which is the ‘golden period.’ This ratio will 
then climb up to 66.0 in 2042 (Fig. 4). The ‘golden 
1982 2002 2022 2042 2062 
1992 2012 2032 2052 2072 
Year 
Fig. 3. Population age distribution in China, 1982-2072 
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Fig. 3. Dependency ratio in China, 1952-2072. 
period’ is due to the large number of people born in 
the 1960s entering the labor force while those leaving 
are the survivors of the much smaller cohorts of the 
1920s. Eventually, the ratio of 65 and over to those 
aged 15-64 will rise continuously from 7.9 in 1982 to 
a peak of 34.1 in 2042. In summary, the projections 
show that in the middle of the 21st century a rela- 
tively small group of workers will be supporting a 
large group of elderly people. 
One may argue that the decline in the number of 
young dependents resulting from lower fertility will 
offset the burden of an aging population to a 
significant extent. As pointed out by Sheppard and 
Rix [15], this would be true only if (1) there were 
person-for-person and a dollar-for-dollar trade off in 
expenditures for these two groups of dependents and 
(2) taxpayers were willing to pass on to the elderly the 
savings by having fewer children. Whereas there has 
been insufficient data concerning the validity of the 
second assumption, we know for fact that the first 
assumption is untrue in the United States. According 
to various estimates, between 1960 and 1979 the 
average government expenditure including Federal, 
state, and local funds on each elderly person was 
about three times the expenditure on each child. In 
1983, the expenditure per child is less than one-tenth 
the expenditure per old person [16]. In view of this 
pattern, an increasingly large old age dependency 
ratio in China may become burdensome long before 
2042. 
SOCIAL ASD ECO.VO>lIC I41PLICATIONS 
Population aging and its consequences have re- 
ceived some attention in China, although the control 
of population growth is clearly the major focus. It is 
generally recognized that population aging will not 
become a critical concern until the 2020s [17, 181. 
There are some discussions of policies dealing with 
population aging in the future and several options 
have been suggested. These include: (1) raising the 
fertility rate to replacement level after the year 2000. 
(2) improving productivity, and (3) implementing a 
social security system [19]. There has been little 
research concerning the societal and economic con- 
sequences of fertility decline and population aging in 
China. In the following, we will briefly describe the 
Chinese systems of old age support and long-term 
and medical care. In addition, policy concerns will be 
identified. 
Old age support 
Old age support in China derives from two major 
sources: employment and family whereas community 
assistance plays a very limited role. One should note 
that old age support cannot be adequately addressed 
without taking into account the sharp disparities in 
financial well-being between rural and urban resi- 
dents. The average income in urban areas is estimated 
to be more than two times as high as its rural 
counterpart [12, p. 471. In 1981, urban income per 
capita was 500 yuan whereas rural income per capita 
was only 223 yuan [20]. 
In urban areas, pension programs are much better 
developed. There are two major programs. One cov- 
ers employees in the state sector including go\-ern- 
ment and party organizations, educational, cultural 
and scientific industrial enterprises. Although 80% of 
the urban workers are employed in the state sector, 
it only accounts for 21% of the total labor force (211. 
Retirement age is 60 for men, 55 for female salaried 
employees, and 50 for female blue-collar workers. 
Furthermore. one needs to have at least IO years’ 
employment in the state sector to collect a pension. 
Pensions range from 60 to 100% of a worker‘s last 
wage dependting on length of service and prior par- 
ticipation in revolutionary work. In addition to the 
pension payment, medical insurance benefits and 
other supplements received before retirement are 
included [72]. The administration and financing of 
pension benefits are the responsibility of individual 
employing institutions. 
The other program. legislated in 1966. covers only 
workers of large urban collectives engaged in light 
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industrv and handicrafts. Employees of these col- 
lectives-constitute less than 5% of China’s total labor 
force [21]. Retirement benefits are less generous than 
those in the state sector. Benefit is payable on retire- 
ment after 20 years of work with eight years of 
continuous service and replaces 45-60% of pre- 
retirement wage. The collectives’ plan does not in- 
clude health insurance. Moreover, it should be noted 
that there is great variation in pension systems among 
collective enterprises. 
Since 1979, as a solution to the increasingly serious 
problem of unemployment, private enterprises have 
been allowed to exist. Employees in the private sector 
and those in small urban collectives are not covered 
by any public pension programs [22]. However, their 
number has expanded from 150.000 to 2.3 million 
between 1978 and 1983. Some provincial and munici- 
pal governments have encouraged government insur- 
ance companies to offer voluntary pension and health 
plans. The extent of such coverage is unknown. 
Out of the 18 million persons of retirement age 
(males aged 60 and over; and females aged 55 and 
over) in urban areas, about 8 million or only some 
45% received pensions in 1981 [24]. In 1983, the 
number of urban pensioners increased to 13 million 
[25]. Persons with no pensions are those who either 
left the labor force before a pension system was 
instituted at their work units or those having worked 
for less than the 10 years needed to be eligible for a 
pension. In addition, there are many people, mainly 
women, who never were members of the labor force. 
As mandated by the law, those older people are to be 
cared for by their children. Only the childless aged 
become the state’s responsibility. The majority of old 
people in urban areas live in extended households 
with a grown child, usually a son. 
For the Chinese elderly, family is the predominant 
mode of support. The rural labor force and workers 
in small urban collectives not covered by a pension 
program must depend on their adult children for old 
age support. More than 75% of the work force falls 
into this category. Consequently elderly men often 
continue to work even into their seventies by taking 
auxiliary jobs. In contrast, elderly women usually 
leave their full-time job completely after the birth of 
their first grandchild and devote their energies to 
household work. This partially accounts for the low 
labor force participation rate for older women. In 
1980, only 180,000 older people, or about 0.4% of all 
rural elderly, received old-age pensions [21]. Recently, 
there has been significant growth in that by the end 
of 1983, some 600,000 rural elderly people in over 
9000 brigades were reported to have received pen- 
sions [26]. Nevertheless, it is uncertain whether such 
a trend will continue. 
According to the Marriage Law, children have the 
duty to support and assist their aged parents. The 
1980 Criminal Law explicitly states that violators of 
the Marriage Law are subject to criminal penalties. 
After the introduction of collective farming in the 
early 1950s people were told that they could rely on 
the collective for ‘five guarantees,’ including food, 
clothing, medical care, housing, and burial expenses. 
However, it soon became apparent, such guarantees 
were to apply only to old people who had no pensions 
or grown sons to support them. Since daughters still 
generally marry out, old people in most rural areas 
can have living daughters and still qualify for ‘five 
guarantees.’ Local communities-neighborhood 
committees in cities and production brigades in rural 
communes-are responsible for the administration 
and financing of social welfare for the needy includ- 
ing the aged. In addition to the ‘five guarantees,’ it 
may also include helping the bedridden with daily 
chores, transportation, and a small cash allowance. 
In 1980, over three million old people, or some 6% 
of all elderly (65 and over) in China received ‘five 
guarantees’ [2 I]. 
Our projection clearly indicates that China will 
have a substantially older population in the middle of 
the 2lst century. A primary policy concern is to 
provide adequate old age support in the years to 
come. Presently because of the small proportion of 
the older population, the needs of China’s aged are 
being met by family initiatives and to some extent by 
state pensions. With the projected sharp increase in 
the number and proportion of old people and the 
decrease in average family size, the present system 
of old age support will be under severe strain. As 
a result of the one-child birth policy, the absence 
of siblings, the subsequent loss of in-laws. uncles. 
aunts, and the thinning out of extended relationships 
would remove a large number of branches from the 
family tree. This is most likely to weaken the family 
network which has been the backbone of old age 
support in China. The goals of family planning are 
clearly in conflict with the traditional family-based 
old age support system. To attain the objectives of 
both birth control and old age support. non-family 
based options for supporting the elderly such as the 
public old age pension systems in the developed 
countries, need to be explored. 
In recent years, there has been an increase in the 
proportion of retired persons in the cities due to 
several factors. Strict control on migration to the 
large cities had the effect of increasing the proportion 
of old people, since migrants are typically young 
people. Compulsory retirement laws are also having 
an impact. Male factory workers and cadres retire at 
age 60. Retirement age for their female counterparts 
is 55. Intellectuals may continue to work until age 65. 
The large majority of the urban labor force is retired 
by age 60. As a result, the number of retirees is 
increased substantially by including not only those 65 
years of age and over, but also those between 60 and 
64. As observed by Goldstein and Goldstein [24, p. 
71, in the cities and towns males aged 60-64 years 
increase the total population of retired men by 65%. 
For women, the adition of the 55-64 age group more 
than doubles the number of retired females. 
There is also an explosion of young retirees (in 
their 50s) as a result of the ding-h system, in which 
adult children are guaranteed jobs in their parent’s 
place of work if the parent retires. With about four 
million young people entering labor force ages annu- 
ally, there is a labor surplus in the urban areas. Most 
young people now expect to wait a full y-ear after 
graduating from secondary school before being as- 
signed a job [24]. This special inducement to early 
retirement was thought to be a useful means of 
dealing with unemployment among young adults. 
However, ding4 has been under official attack since 
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a September 1983 State Council directive. It now 
appears to have been phased out in China. 
There are, hovvever, many exceptions to the man- 
datory retirement policy. Frequently, retirement at 
the mandatory age only occurs when both the em- 
ployer and the employee find it economically expedi- 
ent [4]. If an individual has a special technical skill or 
provides much needed political leadership, manda- 
tory retirement is often not required. in some other 
situations exceptions can be made when an employee 
cannot afford a reduction in income due to heavy 
financial obligations. Moreover. some retirees have 
regular paid jobs and many are engaged in volunteer 
work. 
As suggested by Spengler [26, p. 941, the economic 
well-being of the elderly depends on the old age 
dependency ratio and the proportion of working age 
population which is employed and contributing to 
old age support through pension and social security 
systems. These two conditions in turn depend upon 
how efficiently the economy functions. Despite the 
aging of the population, a manageable old age de- 
pendency ratio can be achieved if the retirement age 
is raised sufficiently. As indicated by our projection, 
given the current retirement age of 60 and assuming 
17.08 million births per vear, the ratio of retirees to 
workers was 13 to 100 ‘in 1982. This ratio can be 
maintained by raising the age of retirement to 64 in 
2002. to 69 in 2022 and to a maximum of 74 in 2042. 
Thereafter the retirement age could be slowly low- 
ered. Similar conclusions were reached by Keyfitz [ 12, 
p. 461. 
As noted by Keyfitz [l2, p. 461. there would 
certainly be objections to such a proposal. The major 
concern would be the unfavorable impact on upward 
mobility for the young. The recent substantial fertility 
decline m China can be viewed as a population wave 
which influences various parts of the economy es- 
pecially those serving specific age groups. These 
include schooling, work and promotion, and retire- 
ment. Keyfitz [B] vividly illustrated the way that an 
increase in the number of older persons slows down 
upward mobility on the part of young people. He 
analyzed the extent that the age of promotion de- 
pends on the rate of population increase under 
different mortality schedules and other circum- 
stances. The effect turns out to be substantial in that 
a change from 2% annual increase to stationary 
condition implies a delay in reaching the middle 
positions of the average factory office of 4.5 years. 
The aged would be perceived as holding on to the 
good jobs. This can be very divisive and may generate 
a lot of intergenerational conflicts. Given that the 
elderly must be provided for, and if the old age 
dependency ratio is high, a choice must be made 
between allowing the elderly to keep their jobs and 
supporting them with tax money. 
iclaintaining a high level of employment for the 
working age population is also critical to the eco- 
nomic well-being of the old. Unemployment in the 
Norking age population reduces the capacity of this 
population to contribute to the pension and social 
security funds. Moreover. unemployment of young 
workers may depress employment and income among 
older workers [26]. Currently, a major problem in 
China is unemployment among young people born in 
the 1960s who are entering the labor force in large 
numbers. Indeed. the ding-ri system was instituted to 
alleviate the problem of unemplovment. However. 
such a system can be very expensive and has only 
limited impact. This is because a shift of individuals 
from the labor force to the retiree category simulta- 
neously decrease the number of contributors to the 
retirement-income stream and increases the number 
drawing upon this stream. 
In 1979, the production responsibility system was 
introduced into the rural areas. This turned the 
collective management system to one of production 
contracts negotiated between the government and 
individual families. It has encouraged the cultivation 
of small private plots and raising of private livestock. 
Restrictions on the private sales of agricultural goods 
have been relaxed. On the other hand. in urban areas, 
private enterprises have been allowed to exist. 
Clearly, many more inflexibilities in the economy 
need to be eliminated in order to reduce un- 
employment. Hence a great flow of funds would be 
available for economic development as well as old age 
support. 
It should be noted that the unemployment problem 
is likely to ease in the 1990s. Using data of the past 
30 years (1952-1982). Chen [29] made projections of 
labor force participation in China for the period 
between 1982 and 1995. The labor force entrants will 
decline by 6.5% per annum from 1989 to 1995 and 
8.8% from 1992 to 1994. The shrinking cohorts from 
the early 1970s will cause a sharp drop in the number 
of laborers entering the labor force at age I8 in the 
early 1990s. 
Long-term and medical care 
As a result of population aging. the demand for 
long-term care in China is expected to increase 
substantially. Currently. the majority of such care is 
provided by the family or volunteers in the commu- 
nity, whereas institutionalized care is reserved as the 
last resort. Nationally only 169,000 elderly people or 
0.33% of the 65 and over population were institu- 
tionalized in 1984. In the urban areas, there were 684 
social welfare homes caring for some 22,000 elderly 
people [30]. In the rural areas, there were 11,000 
homes for the aged which cared for some 147,000 
older people [30, pp. 6 and 311. Nevertheless, esti- 
mates of the institutionalized elderly in the coun- 
tryside vary considerably. Some estimates were as 
high as 21,000 homes housing 241.000 elders in the 
rural areas [32]. Furthermore, as noted by 
Davis-Friedmann, the number of institutionalized 
has fluctuated greatly over the past 30 years as a 
function of government policies [4]. 
Another factor accounting for such a low rate of 
institutionalization is the relatively young age com- 
position of the elderly population. In China the 
proportions of the aged population in the 75-79 and 
80 and over age groups are 11.2 and 6.6% re- 
spectively [6, p, 201. The proportions in the U.S. are 
12.5% (75-79 age group) and 14.9% (80 and over age 
group). In view of the fact that the population in 
China will become older and sicker, and the average 
family size will be substantially reduced, the current 
system is unlikely to meet the increasing need for 
long-term care in the future. Alternative mechanisms 
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for deliverv long-term care, institutionalized as well 
as non-in&tutionalized, need to be explored. 
According to Prescott and Jamison [33], the per 
capita health expenditure in China is relatively high 
for a country at its low per capita income level. In 
1981 the health expenditure accounted for 3.3% of 
Gross Domestic Product per capita which is 25% 
greater than that would be predicted according to the 
pattern in other developing countries. Health care 
financing comes from three major sources: private 
outlays (32%) labor insurance (31%), and state 
budget expenditure (30%). The residual 7% is 
financed by production brigades. As one of the most 
remarkable achievements of the Chinese health sys- 
tern, 70% of the total population is covered by 
various health insurances [33, p. 3971. 
Health insurances in China essentially take three 
forms: government health insurance, labor insurance, 
and rural cooperative insurance. Introduced in 195 1, 
the Government Insurance Scheme provides free 
outpatient and inpatient services (excluding hospital 
meals) to government employees, college teachers, 
and college students. In general only primary mem- 
bers are covered and the dependents receive no 
benefit entitlements. This scheme is exclusively 
financed by the state budget. Workers and staff 
employed in state enterprises with more then 100 
employees are insured by the Labor Insurance 
Scheme. It entitles primary members to free health 
care for life and their dependents to 50% reim- 
bursement of health care costs. The labor insurance 
is financed by the enterprise with no individual 
prepayment by the employee. Implementation of the 
rural cooperative insurance system began in 1968. 
Cooperative insurance schemes generally take the 
form of a prepaid medical insurance plan, organized 
at the production brigade level. Beneficiaries are 
entitled to free or substantially reimbursable services 
and drugs at the brigade health station and also at 
higher level referral units. 
Unlike the health care system in the U.S., the 
Chinese system does not provide any special enti- 
tlement to the aged. Nevertheless, the increasing size 
of the elderly population will exert additional pres- 
sure on the health care system. This is further compli- 
cated by several factors. First. there are sharp dis- 
parities in hospital beds and health personnel 
distributed between the urban and rural areas. In 
1980 there were 3.7 hospital beds per 1000 in urban 
areas but only I.5 per 1000 in rural areas. The 
distribution of physicians is even more uneven with 
2.4 per 1000 people in the urban areas and 0.5 per 
1000 in the countryside [34]. Second, since 1980 the 
rural health system has undergone substantial 
changes whereas the urban system has remained 
intact. Given the general economic reforms, collective 
financing and popular support for the cooperative 
medical system have diminished. The proportion of 
the rural population protected by this system has 
declined by 50%. People now have the option to pay 
more out of their own pockets for better medical 
services. The state also encourages and supports 
physicians to have private practices by setting up 
chrucs or small-scale hospitals. More than 80,000 
doctors are in private practice in China in 1985, an 
increase of more than 63% over the previous year. 
These doctors are more profit-oriented and charge 
more for their services. This has serious implications 
in terms of the continuing education of the primary 
health workers, the barefoot doctors. and the in- 
creasing financial burden of illness on the peasants 
[34, p. 934). Consequently, these reforms may have a 
negative effect on the elderly, since they will have to 
pay more. Those without pensions will be in an even 
more disadvantageous position. 
CONCLUSION 
The social and economic implications of China’s 
aging population are manifold and intermingled with 
many other factors. A sensible analysis of these 
consequences requires a keen awareness of China’s 
unique social, political, and demographic character- 
istics which include a centralized policy-making 
structure, a large rural population, and a fast growing 
private sector. 
A major advantage derived from lowering fertility 
is that additional savings can be devoted to economic 
development. But in the long run, the decline in the 
proportion of young people will be offset by a large 
proportion of the elderly [35]. In addition. the phe- 
nomenon of population aging often coincides with 
other processes such as urbanization and increased 
industrialization. A substantial transformation of the 
occupational structure seems inevitable as the Chi- 
nese economy modernizes. Further economic growth 
will reduce the demand for the sizeable rural manual 
labor force. This major change in the economy, 
together with the accelerated pace of urbanization 
would create an urban population of six and seven 
hundred million sometime in the next century [ 10, p. 
951. 
More importantly, the design and implementation 
of policies on aging have and will continue to be 
centered around the relationship between the tradi- 
tional family and the political state in China. The 
tension already in existence will mount over time as 
the current family planning program further chips 
away the cornerstone of the old age support. The 
state’s capability in replacing part of the re- 
sponsibility from the family hinges on how well the 
modernization program proceeds. The way in which 
these policies are formulated and carried out is 
crucial to the well-being of what will be about 200 
million Chinese elderly by the middle of the 2lst 
century. The aging-related policies and those address- 
ing other concerns must be scrutinized carefully. 
Undoubtedly, China will have to make many difficult 
choices in order to meet the challenge of supporting 
a large aged population in the coming century. 
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